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An external fire can often be the defining case when sizing a relief device for chemical reactive 
hazards. Batch reaction systems can have multiple reactions or have reactions with multiple steps.  
Analyzing every possibility is impractical, so relief device sizing is often performed by conducting 
only one test or simulation per scenario.  However, this simplification can obscure potentially 
significant effects which might then be overlooked in the analysis.  For example, a fire that is 
started while the main reaction is underway could result in an overpressure (due to an exotherm or 
decomposition reaction) less severe than one that starts once the final product has completely 
formed. This can be due to reactants for the main reaction being boiled off before the conditions 
for the worse case are reached.  Other factors that should likewise be considered when performing 




Introduction and Background 
In the chemical processing industry, poor or improper design of the emergency pressure relief 
system for reactive hazards may cause a rupture of the containment vessel, leading to possible 
fires, explosions, or toxic exposure to personnel or the public, depending on the chemicals present. 
A 2002 United States Chemical Safety Board (US CSB) study on reactive hazards identified “167 
serious accidents involving uncontrolled chemical reactions that occurred between 1980 and 
2001”. The result of these accidents was “a total of 108 deaths and hundreds of millions of dollars 
in property damage”.[1] 
An accident at T2 Laboratories in Jacksonville, Florida in 2007 was determined to be due to a 
runaway chemical reaction in a 2500-gallon batch reactor causing 4 fatalities and 32 injuries. 
Following the incident, the US CSB released a report advising companies to “identify and 
thoroughly evaluate reactive hazards in their processes, implement appropriate emergency 
pressure relief systems and other design standards… and carefully manage any changes to existing 
processes…”[2] 
Two common reactive hazards resulting in overpressure are runaway exothermic reactions and 
thermal decomposition or gas producing reactions. A runaway exotherm feeds itself and results in 
an exponential increase in temperature until a reactant depletes. A thermal decomposition reaction, 
though often endothermic, involves the breakdown of larger molecules into numerous smaller 
molecules that are gaseous or more volatile.  Depending on the chemistry, either or both of these 
reactions may lead to rapid pressurization of the containment vessel. The rate of reaction and 
subsequent pressurization further escalate with increased temperature.  
Among the potential causes of the temperature excursion leading to either a runaway exotherm or 
thermal decomposition are (per API Std 521 Section 4.4.11):[3]  
 external fire 
 loss of mixing 
 loss of cooling 
 incorrect charge of reagents 
Each of these potential overpressure scenarios requires careful evaluation and knowledge of the 
reactive process and the tools and methodologies for evaluating the relief system design.  
RAGAGEP for the reactive hazard evaluation and pressure relief system design includes the 
DIERS Project Manual[4], CCPS “Guidelines for Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling 
Systems,”[5] and API Std 521[3].  The general procedure is to first perform a bench scale test to 
simulate the upset condition, and then to use the results of the test to characterize the system.  Once 
the reaction is characterized, the relief case can be modeled to determine the overpressure 
protection requirements.  Depending on the overpressure scenario under consideration, the relief 
case model configuration may change, in terms of heat added/removed (fire/loss of 
cooling/mixing), feed added (incorrect charge), and homogenous concentration assumptions (loss 
of mixing).  When evaluating the relief case in a transient model, the modeling assumptions for 
the external fire heat input should be carefully considered, as the impact on the relief system design 
can be significant. 
Bench Scale Test and Reaction Modeling 
Identification of reactive hazards at temperatures above that of the intended main reaction can be 
performed by conducting a calorimetry test.  The purpose of the calorimetry test is to determine at 
what temperatures different chemical reactions occur, as well as estimate their rate and 
exothermicity.   
The test is typically performed by mixing the components per the normal reaction procedure; then, 
upon reaching a stable temperature, adding heat slowly and periodically, until a set limit has been 
reached.  Typical readings include pressure and temperature data as the system temperature is 
increased.  For liquid phase reactions, the pressure rise is typically due to vaporization of the 
reactor contents or a reaction producing moles of gas.  Note that there are often multiple reactions 
that can take place in a single calorimetry test, and each reaction will have its own rate equation 
and rate constant.  Gas sample analysis and liquid composition analysis can also be conducted to 
identify the abnormal reaction products and help characterize the reactions. 
Once the reactions in the bench scale test have been characterized, the collected temperature and 
pressure data can be reproduced in a model, where the kinetics and activation energy for each 
reaction can be tuned to reproduce the observed results.  The adiabaticity (phi factor) of the 
calorimeter should also be identified and considered in the determination of the heat of reaction.  
It should be noted that each calorimetry technique has its own set of limitations and should be 
carefully weighed when analyzing reactive hazards. For example, the bench scale test containment 
vessel temperature and pressure rating is a practical limit on the data collection; any reactive 
behavior that occurs at temperatures above the test pressure may require further analysis to 
identify. 
Pressure Relief Modeling for the Reactive System 
API Std 521 states that, “[w]here feasible, a pressure relief device should be used to control 
overpressure.”[3] To determine the sizing of the pressure relief device, a transient model of the 
reactive system, including the vaporization of material in the reactive system due to heat input 
from external fire, and the analysis of onset and disengagement of 2-phase relief, can be performed 
using a simulation package and following the methodologies outlined in API Stds 521 & 520 Part 
I and in the CCPS and DIERS literature.[3][4][5][6]   
 Modeling of the external fire heat input to the pressure containing system can be 
done using the API Std 521 empirical equation or the analytical method described 
in Annex A, with allowable credits for insulation or other heat input reduction 
factors.   
 The capacity of the pressure relief device can determined using the direct 
integration sizing equation described in API Std 520 Part I Annex B, as two phase 
relief is often expected. 
 The two-phase onset and disengagement behavior (including calculation of the 
liquid swelled level height at any point in time) can be modeled using the guidance 
in the DIERS Project Manual or other DIERS literature.  
When modeling the reaction behavior during the upset conditions, there are two important 
temperature-dependent considerations affecting the reaction rate: the reaction rate constant and 
volatility.   The reaction rate constant (as defined by the Arrhenius equation) is dependent on the 




With more energy in the system due to the external fire heat input, the rate of each reaction is 
expected to increase.  This also changes the concentration of each component in the system as the 
intended reaction is replaced by unintended side reactions.  Volatility affects the reaction rate in 
the opposite manner; for liquid phase reactions, vaporization of a component removes moles from 
the liquid concentration, and, depending on the order of the reaction, this can drive the reaction 
rate down, and ultimately terminate a reaction.  It is also important to recognize that the volatility 
of any system component can reduce the overall composition of the reactor system contents; as 
the system is modeled with two phase relief, the venting of vapor can carry liquid components out 
through the relief path.  
In a steady state model, as long as flammable sources are in the area, an external fire is often taken 
as a given and the fire heat input assumed constant.  Because the model of the relief rate is constant, 
the question of when the fire starts and stops is somewhat irrelevant, and therefore often ignored.  
However, if the same assumptions are carried over to a transient model, starting the fire 
simultaneously with the start of the reaction process, the results may be misleading.  For example, 
the fire may interfere with the loading of the reactor, the duration of fire exposure could boil off 
reactants before an exotherm is reached, or the heat from the fire could push the temperature 
beyond a self-heating limit such that the reactor may not see an exotherm until well after the fire 
is extinguished.  
Rather than suggesting a fully dynamic model of the fire heat input, which would add a significant 
amount of complexity and permutation to an already complex and computationally intensive 
process, it is proposed that the heat input due to external fire can be modeled with the simplified 
assumption of constant heat input, but with consideration given to the fire initiation time, fire 
duration time, and post-fire time. 
Note: the thermal mass of the reactor contents (mCp) is an important factor in any transient model 
of external fire, affecting how quickly the temperature of the contents will rise due to heat input 
(the time required to reach the bubble point or reaction onset temperature is often referred to as 
the heat-up time); however, it is a constant consideration and not specific to any particular time 
domain. 
Fire Initiation Time 
The following should be considered when determining the most appropriate point in time to model 
the fire heat input. 
Reaction operation procedure – How would a fire impact the charging of the reactor? 
The first consideration is the reactor charging procedure.  If the reactor charge is automatic, then 
charge to the reactor may continue uninterrupted.  However, if the charge is manual, there may be 
a period where it is unlikely the reactor feed procedure would continue normally.  For example, in 
one instance evaluated, the reactor charge was fed by a hopper which required the operator to open 
multiple sacks of reactor feed (transported via forklift).  If the fire broke out after the first sack of 
reagent was added, it was determined the operator would not re-enter the area to continue adding 
more reagent.   
Additionally, if the reactor feed is controlled by automated safety systems, the response of the 
safety systems due to pressure or temperature deviations resulting from the fire heat input may 
impact the model (depending on the reliability of these systems, with special consideration of their 
reliability in the event of fire).   
Component concentration – What components will be present when the fire starts? 
Depending on the reaction equation and order for each reaction, the reaction rate(s) may be driven 
by the concentration of specific components.  Prior to the start of the fire, the intended reaction(s) 
can be expected to proceed normally.  If these result in the production of more stable, less volatile 
components, then this can slow the pressurization rate of the system, and vice versa.  Similarly, 
decomposition of the reagents may be more or less severe than decomposition of the products.  
However, due to the all the potential factors involved, this can be a difficult thing to predict, and 
may require trial and error to identify the worst case. 
Fire Duration Time 
After the fire has started and heat is being modeled as an active input to the reactive system, the 
following should be considered when determining the duration of the fire. 
Length of fire exposure – How long is the pressure containing system exposed to the external fire?   
Both NFPA 30 and API Std 521 require that the installation (or components thereof) be designed 
to withstand a minimum of two hours of fire exposure (given in terms of temperature exposure).  
Beyond the two hours, the integrity of the equipment, insulation, or the supporting structure may 
be compromised.  Even if there is no loss of containment, the effective maximum working pressure 
may be reduced to the point where the protection of the equipment can no longer be provided by 
a pressure relief device (i.e., the set pressure of the pressure relief device is above the effective 
MAWP), and other forms of protection or risk mitigation may be required.  For this reason, 
transient fire pressure relief models (including non-reactive models) are often run with a limit of 
two hours.   
However, for reactive systems, it is a better practice to also consider the pressure relief device 
response.  If the pressure relief device has opened prior to the close of the two-hour window, then, 
if the relief device is still open or close to opening, then letting the fire heat input continue may 
produce a worse case result for the pressure relief system design.  If the pressure relief device has 
not lifted, but will open shortly after the two-hour window, then the pressure relief system design 
should consider the sizing based on this case.  For example, in one model, it was determined that 
relief would occur at 2 hours and 14 minutes after the start of the fire; the pressure relief system 
was sized for the fire relief load and documented as such.  However, care should be exercised that 
the duration of fire exposure does not exceed common sense.  Note that regardless of the fire 
duration modeled, if credit was taken for reduced heat input due to fireproof insulation, this credit 
should not be taken after two hours of fire exposure. 
If the pressure relief device has already opened, vented, and reclosed, and the pressure rise rate is 
not likely to reopen the device (i.e. the overwhelming majority of the reactor contents have been 
vented off already), then continued fire heat input is not likely to increase the required size of the 
pressure relief device; rather, loss of the liquid contents to absorb the fire heat would likely result 
in overtemperature of the vessel walls.  An interesting side note is that increasing the size of the 
pressure relief device can also contribute to this result, in that the larger area expedites the venting 
off of the reactor contents. 
There is also the possibility that a longer duration of fire exposure can make the relief requirement 
less severe.  In one example, two hours’ worth of fire exposure managed to vent off the contents 
of the reactor to the point that the exotherm was not the determining factor in the relief system 
design.  If the fire had lasted a shorter duration, it is theoretically possible that a worse case relief 
requirement might emerge due to having more reactants in the liquid phase to produce the 
exotherm or to thermally decompose.  This potential should also be considered if and when 
choosing to extend the fire beyond the two-hour window (i.e., letting the model run longer with 
fire heat input can boil off the components that may have led to a secondary exotherm).  While it 
may not be practical to check for this possibility at every possible fire duration, simply being aware 
of the basis for the pressure relief system design (fire vaporization vs. exotherm) can help 
determine the most appropriate response. 
Post-Fire Time 
Length of time after fire is extinguished – After the fire is extinguished, is there still a risk of 
overpressure due to a runaway exotherm? 
In the event that the transient model does terminate the fire heat input after 2 hours of exposure, it 
is important not to simply stop the analysis there.  Having absorbed the heat from the fire, the 
reactive system may still have received enough energy to start a self-heating reaction, starting 
down the path to a runaway exotherm.  It is possible that this relief may not be observed until many 
hours later.   
Conclusion 
The US Chemical Safety Board, the American Petroleum Institute, and the Design Institute for 
Emergency Relief Systems have all stated the importance of considering the impact of external 
fire on the pressure relief system design for reactive systems.  Although powerful tools and 
methodologies are available to perform detailed transient analysis of overpressure scenarios for 
reactive systems, when getting down to the details of modeling these scenarios, it is important not 
to overlook the impact of our assumptions.  For the external fire overpressure scenario specifically, 
we can gain a better understanding of the potential problems by asking a few simple questions: 
 How is the reaction going to proceed when the fire starts? 
 What will be present in the reactor when the fire starts? 
 For how long should the fire be modeled? 
 What should be done after the fire heat input stops? 
No company has an unlimited budget to run an infinite number of model permutations; however, 
awareness of the impacts of time-dependent factors lets the user exercise discretion and determine 
the most appropriate modeling assumptions. 
References 
1. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. Hazard Investigation: Improving 
Reactive Hazard Management. U.S. CSB, 2002. 
2. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. T2 Laboratories, Inc. Runaway 
Reaction. US CSB, 2009. 
3. American Petroleum Institute. API Standard 521: Pressure-relieving and Depressuring 
Systems, Sixth Edition. API Publishing Services,Washington, D.C, 2014. 
4. H. G. Fisher, et al. Emergency Relief System Design Using DIERS Technology: The Design 
Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS) Project Manual. John Wiley & Sons, New 
York, 1992. 
5. AIChE CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety). Guidelines for Pressure Relief and 
Effluent Handling Systems. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1998. 
6. American Petroleum Institute. API Standard 520: Sizing, Selection, and Installation of 
Pressure-relieving Devices: Part I - Sizing and Selection, Ninth Edition. API Publishing 
Services, Washington, D.C, 2014. 
 
 
 
